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ASPASIUS ON NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS  : AN ANCIENT EXAMPLE
OF ‘HIGHER CRITICISM’?
CARLO NATALI
1. Received opinions
 NE 7. 14 Aristotle seems to identify pleasure and happiness:
Presumably it is even necessary, given that there are unimpeded activities
of each state, and happiness is the activity of all of them or of one of them,
that this activity, provided that it is unimpeded, is most desirable; but this
is pleasure. (1153B9–12)
On this passage, Aspasius notes in his commentary (In NE 151.
18–27 Heylbut):1
δι µν οupsilonlenistildeν τοupsilonacuteτων δοκε ταupsilonlenisτν ποφανεσθαι τγαθν κα τν δονν· οupsilonlenis µν
οupsilonasperacuteτως χει, λλ πρς τοupsilongraveς λ$γοντας γ$νεσιν ε%ναι & φαupsilonacuteλας τινς τ'ν δον'ν,
ο(ς2 κα δι) αupsilonlenisτ τ µ ε%ναι αupsilonlenisτν3 τ γαθν *πιγνεται [κα]4 *πιχειρε *νδ+ξως
.ς *νν αupsilonlenisτν τ /ριστον λ$γειν, *πε ν γε τος Νικοµαχεοις, νθα διεληπται
κα περ δον2ς 3ριστοτ$λης σαφ'ς ε4ρηκεν αupsilonlenisτν µ ταupsilonlenisτν ε%ναι τ52 εupsilonlenisδαιµον6α
λλ παρακολουθεν “8σπερ τος κµαοις τν 8ραν”. σηµειωτ$ον5 δ τοupsilontilde µ
ε%ναι τοupsilontildeτ) 3ριστοτ$λους λλ) Εupsilonlenisδµου τ *ν τ<'6 λ$γειν περ δον2ς .ς οupsilonlenisδ$πω
περ αupsilonlenisτ2ς διειλεγµ$νου· πλν ε4τε Εupsilonlenisδµου ταupsilontildeτ= *στιν ε4τε 3ριστοτ$λους,
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My thanks to David Sedley and David Charles for help with the improvement of
my English text.
1 References are to G. Heylbut, Aspasii in Ethica Nicomachea quae supersunt com-
mentaria [Heylbut] (Berlin, 1889).
2 ο(ς Rose: >ς codd.; del. Spengel. 3 αupsilonlenisτν Spengel: αupsilonlenisτ codd.
4 Secl. Hayduck.
5 σηµειωτ$ον codd.: σηµεονL.Spengel, ‘ •Uber die unter denNamen desAristoteles
erhaltenen Ethischen Schriften’ [‘Ethische Schriften’], Bayer. Ak. derWiss., Sitzung
phil.-hist. Kl., 24/4 (1841), 1–115 at 85, and all subsequent editors. I maintain the
text of the manuscripts, on the basis of a similar passage in Olympiodorus (In Cat.
75. 11–12 Busse).
6 MS Z (Parisinus gr. 1903) has a lacuna here, supplemented with δεκ=τ<ω by
Spengel and others; see Spengel, ‘Ethische Schriften’, 86.
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*νδ+ξως ε4ρηται· δι τοupsilontildeτο λ$γεται τ /ριστον δον, ?τι σupsilongraveν τ<' ρστ<ω κα
χ@ριστον αupsilonlenisτοupsilontilde.7
With these words, then, he seems to say that the good and pleasure are
one and the same. But this is not the case. Rather, against those who say
that pleasure is a process or that some pleasures are base, for whom it also
follows, for this reason, that pleasure is not the good, he argues on the
basis of reputed opinion that it is possible to call pleasure the supreme
good. For at least in the Nicomachean Ethics, in the place where he does
make distinctions on pleasure, he says clearly that pleasure is not the same
thing as happiness, but accompanies it ‘as the bloom accompanies the cheek
of youth’ [NE 1174B33]. As evidence that this is not by Aristotle but by
Eudemus one should cite the fact that in <book 10> he [=Aristotle] talks
about pleasure as if he had not yet discussed it. But whether those words
express Eudemus’ or Aristotle’s view, this is an argument drawn from
reputed opinion; he says that pleasure is the supreme good for the following
reason: it accompanies the supreme good and cannot be separated from it.
The passage attracted discussion in the nineteenth century, because
it seems to attribute a section of theNicomacheanEthics (τοupsilontildeτο, 151.
24) to Eudemus and not to Aristotle. Spengel maintained that As-
pasius was still close enough to the rediscovery of Aristotle’s works
to be able to discuss the attribution of books of the Nicomachean
Ethics, and suggested that the passage presents its argument as ‘nur
ein dialektischer Versuch’.8 But a bolder interpretation emerged in
the twentieth century. According to Paul Moraux, Aspasius in this
passage touches on a problem of interest to ‘higher criticism’, one
concerned, that is, with the attribution of authorship—in this case,
the question whether the so-called commonbooks (NE 5–7 =EE 4–
6) should be attributed to the Nicomachean Ethics or the Eudemian
Ethics. He maintains that the author of the passage argues on the
basis of common opinions (*νδ+ξως, 21 and 26), but also cites the
Nicomachean Ethics as a work di·erent from the one that contains
7 This section of Aspasius’ commentary (150. 31–151. 27) is very di¶cult and
full of lacunae. It has been edited many times: by H. Hase, ‘Aspasiou scholi»on
eis ta Ethica tou Aristotelous epitom»e’, Classical Journal, 28 (1823), 306–17, and
29 (1824), 104–18 at 117; Spengel, ‘Ethische Schriften’, 84–5; V. Rose, ‘ •Uber die
griechischen Comment•are zur Ethik des Aristoteles’, Hermes, 5 (1871), 61–113 at
107; andHeylbut. There is a modern translation only for the commentary on book 8,
in D. Konstan, Commentators on Aristotle on Friendship [Commentators] (London,
2001) (Aspasius at 13–57). A complete translation of Aspasius’ commentary by
Professor Konstan is in preparation. I would like to thank him very warmly for
allowing me to read it in draft, and for many useful comments on a ﬁrst version
of the present article.
8 L.Spengel, ‘EthischeSchriften’, 84; ‘nichmehrals eineConjectur’, he adds (85).
Created on 19 May 2007 at 10.02 hours page 348
Aspasius on Nicomachean Ethics 7 349
the present passage.Moraux takes lines 24–5 to mean that Aspasius
is uncertain whether the common books belong to the Eudemian or
Nicomachean Ethics.9 He adds that it is not certain whether Aspa-
sius considered all the common books to belong to the Eudemian
Ethics, or only the ﬁnal chapters of book 7, 12–15.
Further, Moraux quotes a comment by Aspasius onNE 8, 1155B
13–16, which states: ‘Even things di·erent in species admit of de-
gree. We have discussed this matter [upsilonasperπρ αupsilonlenisτ'ν] previously.’10As-
pasius’ comments:
οικε δ εBρ2σθαι *ν τος *κπεπτωκ+σι τ'ν Νικοµαχεων. (In NE 161. 9–10)
It appears that they were discussed in the books that have fallen out of
the Nicomachean Ethics.
Moraux thinks that Aspasius is here referring to the lacuna that
must be admitted to exist between NE 4 and 8, if the common
books are attributed to the Eudemian Ethics.
Moraux’s interpretation has been revived by Anthony Kenny, in
an important book about the relationship between the Eudemian
and Nicomachean Ethics.11 Kenny claims, inter alia, that (i) the
common books belong to the Eudemian Ethics, and (ii) before the
second century ad, the Eudemian Ethics was preferred to the Nico-
machean Ethics by ancient authors. According to Kenny, the situ-
9 P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, ii. Der Aristotelismus im I. und
II. Jh. n. Chr. [Aristotelismus] (Berlin and New York, 1984), 258–61.
10 Modern editions of the Nicomachean Ethics have upsilonasperπρ αupsilonlenisτ'ν. This use of upsilonasperπ$ρ
is quite rare in Aristotle, and for this reason Ramsauer, Grant, Stewart, Tricot,
and Gauthier think that it is a spurious interpolation. But Aspasius’ text here has
περ αupsilonlenisτ'ν. Regarding the point referred to, among those scholars who accept the
passage as authentic Susemihl and Dirlmeier follow Aspasius, Irwin thinks that
the allusion is to Cat. 6B10–17 or to NE 2. 8, Burnet and Broadie just say that
the reference is uncertain. E. Berti, ‘Amicizia e “Focal Meaning”’, in A. Alberti
and R. W. Sharples (eds.), Aspasius: The Earliest Extant Commentary on Aristotle’s
Ethics [Aspasius] (Berlin and New York, 1999), 176–90 at 178, thinks that the
reference is to 1096B8–16.
11 A. Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics [Ethics] (Oxford, 1978), 29–36. Shorter or
more prudent versions of the same interpretation can be found in C. Rowe, The
Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge, 1971); R. Bode•us, ‘Contribution
›a l’histoire des ¥uvres morales d’Aristote: les testimonia’, Revue philosophique de
Louvain, 71 (1973), 451–67 at 452–3; H. B. Gottschalk, ‘Aristotelian Philosophy
in the Roman World from the Time of Cicero to the End of the Second Cen-
tury ad’ [‘Aristotelian Philosophy’], in W. Haase and F. Temporini (eds.), Aufstieg
und Niedergang der r•omischen Welt, 2.36.2 [Aufstieg] (Berlin and New York, 1987),
1079–174 at 1158; F. Becchi, ‘Aspasio commentatore di Aristotele’ [‘Aspasio’], in
Haase and Temporini (eds.), Aufstieg, 5365–96 at 5368; J. Barnes, ‘An Introduction
to Aspasius’, in Alberti and Sharples (eds.), Aspasius, 1–50 at 19–21.
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ation had radically changed by the time of Alexander of Aphro-
disias, and since then the supremacy of the Nicomachean to the
Eudemian Ethics has been taken for granted. In general, Kenny
thinks (iii) that the Eudemian Ethics is the more important treatise,
from both a philosophical and a historical point of view.
In this paper I shall discuss only Kenny’s interpretation of the
passage quoted above from Aspasius’ commentary. Kenny mainly
follows Moraux’s interpretation, with just a few changes, and in-
serts it into his reconstruction of the history of the Nicomachean
and Eudemian Ethics in the period between the fourth century bc
and the second century ad. He writes:
In Aspasius’ writing we ﬁnd the situation with which we have been fa-
miliar for centuries: the Nicomachean Ethics is the undoubted treatise of
Aristotle, the Eudemian Ethics is the problematic treatise whose attribu-
tion ﬂuctuates, regarded now as authentic Aristotle, now as the work of
his disciple Eudemus. But if Aspasius departs from the earlier tradition
in his ranking the two Ethics, he is at one with it—as we shall see—in
regarding the disputed books as belonging essentially to the Eudemian
version. (29–30)
Kenny quotes the passage 151. 18–27, and followsMoraux’s inter-
pretation: Aspasius is in doubt as to whether this passage ofNE 7,
and by implication the common books in general, belongs to the
Nicomachean or to the Eudemian Ethics. He repeats Moraux’s ar-
gument according to which the phrase ‘in the Nicomachean Ethics’
(*ν τος Νικοµαχεοις, 151. 21–2) implies that Aspasius takes him-
self to be commenting on a work di·erent from the Nicomachean
Ethics. But his reading of the text is more accurate than Moraux’s
and he sees the implications of the argumentmore clearly. First, he
notes that the attribution of book 7 (and the others) to Eudemus
is only one of the possible explanations considered by Aspasius;
second, he points out that in his interpretation Aspasius attributes
book 7 not to the Eudemian Ethics but to Eudemus himself. This
implies that Aspasius thinks that Eudemus is the author of the Eu-
demian Ethics. But such a conjecture has damaging consequences
for the unity of Aspasius’ commentary itself. If NE 7 belongs to
the Eudemian Ethics and that work is by Eudemus, how could the
commentary on this book and the commentary onNE 1–4 and 8 be
part of the same work? Kenny lists two possibilities. According to
the ﬁrst, we have fragments of two Aspasian commentaries, one on
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the Nicomachean Ethics, to which the comments on books 1–4 and
8 belong, and one on the EudemianEthics, to which the fragment of
the commentary on book 7 belongs. But Kenny thinks rather that,
when commenting on NE 1–4, Aspasius found many forward re-
ferences to the common books, and suggests that, since in his time
there were copies of the Eudemian Ethics containing the common
books, the following may be hypothesized:
In these circumstances Aspasius, having commented on books 1–4 of the
NE, proceeded to comment on books 5–6 of the Eudemian Ethics, in order
to have a full commentary on Aristotle’s ethical system, in spite of the
lacuna in the Nicomachean version. (32, cf. 33)
But how could Aspasius have produced such a ‘full commentary
on Aristotle’s ethical system’ by adding some Eudemian books to
the Nicomachean Ethics, if he clearly thought that Eudemus and
Aristotle had di·erent ethical theories, at least on pleasure?
Kenny recalls Moraux’s observation on the passage 161. 9–10
and discusses the cross-references between the parts of the com-
mentary in order to ﬁnd some di·erence between the way in which
Aspasius quotes the common books and his commentary on the
undisputed Nicomachean Ethics books (34–5). This is a point we
shall discuss later.12
At the end of his discussion, however, Kenny remarks that As-
pasius is not certain whether the common books are by Eudemus,
and notes that there are passages of the commentary where As-
pasius refers to some of the common books as the work of Aris-
totle, whereas in other passages he attributes them to Eudemus
(35).
There should be a simpler way to interpret this passage. In my
view, (1) in lines 151. 24 and 26 the pronouns ‘this’ (τοupsilontildeτο) and
‘these’ (ταupsilontildeτα) refer not to the passage, or to the entire seventh
book, let alone to the three common books, but only to the speciﬁc
argument of NE 1153B7–12. Aspasius is not saying that the text
he is commenting on was written by Eudemus; rather he is saying
that here Aristotle is not speaking in his own name but is reporting
someone else’s argument, namely Eudemus’. (2) In the remaining
parts of Aspasius’ commentary there is no indication that he takes
12 Becchi, ‘Aspasio’, 5369, sees the weakness of the hypothesis and maintains
rightly that the passage 161. 9–10 could be interpreted as a reference to a lost
passage or section of the Nicomachean Ethics, and not to an entire book, as Kenny
suggests (Ethics, 34).
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the common books to belong to a treatise di·erent from the Nico-
machean Ethics or not to be by Aristotle. (3) An examination of his
comments on the ﬁrst two arguments of 7. 14 (150. 3–151. 27) can
help to explain why Aspasius thinks that Aristotle is here quoting
someone else’s opinion.
To argue in favour of these three claims, I shall ﬁrst examine
some external and general features of the whole commentary, and
then discuss the passage 150. 3–151. 27 in detail.
2. The authorship of the books commented on by Aspasius
Let us consider the passage in which Aspasius’ comments occur,
and his view on the authorship and constitution of Aristotle’s ethi-
cal treatise. In the manuscripts the commentary has a title for every
book. They always say: ‘Aspasius’ comments on book . . . of Aris-
totle’sEthics’,13 but in two cases there is a variant reading: ‘Aspasius
on book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle’ and ‘Aspasius’
scholia on book 8 of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics’.14 To be sure,
the evidence is weak because these titles could be late. But perhaps
the commentary itself provides better clues.
There is some evidence that Aspasius took all the material he was
commenting on to be by Aristotle, including book 7. He often says
in his comments: ‘Aristotle says/adds/wants/does not say’, etc. The
name of Aristotle as author of the relevant material appears in his
commentaries on all of the books: seven times in the commentary on
book 1, three times on book 2, seven times on book 3, twelve times
on book 4, and three times on book 8.15This applies also to book 7,
where Aspasius quotes Aristotle as the author of the sections on
akrasia (133. 15–16; 19–20; 136. 7–8; 138. 19–20; 139. 12–13) and
on pleasure (150. 5; 154. 20–1). It is impossible to interpret the
above-quoted passage, 151. 18–27, as indicating that some part of
13 Book 1, ‘Aspasius’ scholia on Aristotle’s Ethics’ (1. 1); book 2, ‘On book 2 of
Aristotle’s Ethics’ (37. 1), or ‘On the second of Aristotle’s ethical books’ (in app.,
p. 37 Heylbut); book 3, ‘On book 3 of Aristotle’s Ethics’ (58. 1); book 4, ‘The scholia
of the philosopher Aspasius on book 4 of Aristotle’s Ethics’ (95. 1); book 7, ‘Aspasius
on book 7 of Aristotle’s Ethics’ (127. 1); book 8, ‘Aspasius on book 8 of Aristotle’s
Ethics’ (158. 1).
14 According to Heylbut’s apparatus, the variant title for book 7 is to be found
in MS Z. In fact it is in Parisinus gr. 1902 (sec. xvi, very close to Z), fo. 115v; the
variant title for book 8 is in the Aldine edition (1536).
15 See the references in Heylbut’s Index nominum s.n. 3ριστοτ$λης.
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book 7, or the entire book, is by Eudemus. In fact, three pages later,
commenting on 1154A15–16, Aspasius tells us that ‘Aristotle says
in general that all the goods of the body have an excess [καθ+λου
δ$ φησιν C 3ριστοτ$λης σωµατικ'ν γαθ'ν π=ντων ε%ναι upsilonasperπερβολν]’
(154. 20–1). He clearly considers Aristotle to be the author of the
entire book.
3. Cross-references in Aspasius
There is, it seems, enough evidence to show that Aspasius consi-
ders the Ethics on which he is commenting to form a continuous
whole, composed of books 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, (9), and 10. This
is clear from his way of citing the other books of the Nicomachean
Ethics when he is commenting on one of them. The most quoted
book is 6, which is referred to in his surviving comments on all
the other books except book 8. This preference is understandable
because book 6 containsmany of the central doctrines of Aristotle’s
ethics and many deﬁnitions which are needed to explain the doc-
trines of the other books. But Aspasius seems to have used book 6
in a systematic way, as the key to understanding the meaning of
Aristotle’s expressions in other books, disregarding the nuances
that arise from the usage of a term in books other than 6. The
most important element absent from Aspasius’ commentary is the
progression implicit in Aristotle’s analysis. Aristotle starts in the
ﬁrst pages of the Nicomachean Ethics by using terms in their more
commonmeaning, and reﬁnes them as the discussion proceeds. As-
pasius, on the contrary, takes the results of the analysis for granted
already at the beginning, and so imposes on Aristotle’s procedures
a systematic aspect that is far from the dialectical and rhetorical
procedures of the Nicomachean Ethics.
But let us conﬁne ourselves to the raw data. Book 6 is cited
eight times in the commentary on the other books, books 1 and 10
ﬁve times, books 2 and 5 four times, and book 3 just once.16 The
commentaries on books 7 and 8 have internal citations but are not
cited in the commentaries on the other books. They do, however,
often quote the other books: the commentary on book 7 has nine
citations,17 that on book 8 ﬁve citations,18 that on book 1 seven,
16 See the list of passages on p. 243A of Heylbut’s edition.
17 Two of book 1 (141. 26–7; 146. 15–16), one of book 2 (123. 2–3), one of book 3
[See next page for n. 17 cont. and n. 18
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that on book 2 only two, that on book 3 none, and that on book 4
four. This adds up to a network of reciprocal references, with some
gaps (Table 1).
 1
Comm.: 1 2 3 4 7 8 total
Book
1 ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ 5
2 ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ (?) 4
3 ÿ 1
4 0
5 ÿ (?) ÿ ÿÿ 4
6 ÿÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿÿ ÿ 8
7 0
8 0
9 0
10 ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ 5
total 7 2 0 4 9 5
As might be expected, the commentaries on the ﬁrst books often
cite the subsequent books with expressions meaning ‘later’, and
those on the later books cite the earlier oneswith expressionsmean-
ing ‘before’ or ‘at the beginning’. When commenting on book 1,
Aspasius cites book 10 with the words ‘on which he will speak
later’ (περ Eς upsilonasperacuteστερον *ρε)19 or ‘he will be more speciﬁc about it
(152. 22–7, the only citation of this book in the commentary outside the commentary
to book 3 itself), three of book 6 (136. 28–137. 3; 140. 23–7 and 29–31), and three
of book 10 (141. 24–6; 151. 18–19).
18 Three of them, understandably, of book 5 on justice, because friendship and
justice are closely connected subjects (160. 11–12; 175. 3–4; 178. 19–22), one of
book 1 (162. 1–6), and one of book 2 (158. 5–11).
19 There is a problem in this passage: at 19. 2–3, having quoted NE 1098A17–18,
Aspasius adds: ‘that is, the virtue of contemplation, concerning which he will speak
later—the presence of complete virtue clearly being presupposed’ (περ Eς upsilonasperacuteστερον
*ρε, προϋπαρχοupsilonacuteσης δηλον+τι τ2ς καλοκαγαθας). Here the mention of kalokagathia
seems to be a reference to EE 8. 3 and not only toNE 10. But in any case NE 10. 7 is
clearly being cited, because it would not be accurate to say that in EE 8. 3 there is an
analysis of ρετ θεωρητικ. It seems that, while Aspasius was providing a forward
reference to NE 10. 7. EE 8. 3 also came into his mind.
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later’ (upsilonasperacuteστερον δ κριβ@σει περ αupsilonlenisτ2ς: 19. 2; 23. 28–9). Regarding
book 6, some of the citations we ﬁnd in book 1 are only implicit
(6. 27), and others limit themselves to quoting the text of book 6
verbatim, without reference to its position. For example:
Bδως δ καλεν εB@θασι τ$χνην τν ποιητικν. ποδδωσι δ αupsilonlenisτ<' λ+γον C 3ρι-
στοτ$λης λ$γων “τ$χνη *στν Hξις µετ λ+γου ποιητικ” (2. 23–5)
In the strict sense people are accustomed to call the productive art techn»e.
Aristotle provides it with a deﬁnition, when he says ‘art is the productive
habit, involving reasoning’—
the reference being to NE 1140A10. But there is also a passage of
the commentary on book 1 where Aspasius cites book 6 thus:
λλ ταupsilonacuteτην γε λupsilonacuteει τν ποραν προϊ@ν· φησ γρ τ µηδν κωλupsilonacuteειν τν *λ=ττω
προστ=σσειν περ τ'ν κρειττ+νων, ο(ον <προστ=σσει>  πολιτικ κα ναοupsilongraveς θε'ν
κατασκευ=ζεσθαι κα σ$βειν αupsilonlenisτοupsilonacuteς (8. 32–4)
But he solves that aporia later: for he says that nothing prevents the inferior
from giving orders about the superior: for instance politics <enjoins> that
temples of the gods be built and that people worship them—
the reference being to book 6, 1145A6–11.
From these passages we can infer that the commentary on book 1
does not discriminate between book 10, an undisputed part of the
Nicomachean Ethics, and book 6, one of the common books. Both
texts alike are ones that the reader will encounter ‘later’. There is
no sign that Aspasius considersNE 6 to be part of another work or
its commentary to be distinct from the commentary on book 1.
This suggestion is conﬁrmed by Aspasius’ commentary on book
2, where book 6 is again referred to as a text that will be read ‘later’.
He ﬁnds a passage where Aristotle refers forward to chapters 1 and
13 of book 6, and paraphrases it by saying:
τς δ$ *στιν C Kρθς λ+γος upsilonasperacuteστερον Lηθσεται κα π'ς χει πρς τς /λλας
ρετ=ς (40. 7–8)
It will be said later what right reason is and how it is related to other
virtues.20
Aristotle himself in book 2 refers to NE 6. 1 and 13 as something
20 Cf. NE 1103B32–4: Lηθσεται δ) upsilonasperacuteστερον . . . τ *στιν C Kρθς λ+γος, κα π'ς χει
πρς τς /λλας ρετ=ς. Ramsauer, Dirlmeier, Gauthier, and Tricot think that the
reference is to 6. 1 and 13. Stewart and Broadie refer to book 6 or to ‘what may
have corresponded to it in the original NE treatise’. Bywater and Burnet delete the
passage.
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which will come later, and Aspasius picksup this indication without
expressing any doubt about Aristotle’s authorship.
The commentary on book 4 refers back to books 1 and 2 as some-
thing already read. At 120. 25–6 Aspasius paraphrases Aristotle
again, and refers back to book 1, calling it ‘the ﬁrst discussions’:
λεγε δ κα *ν τος πρ@τοις λ+γοις ?τι περ τ'ν πρακτ'ν τupsilonacuteπ<ω µν στι λ$γειν.
He said in the ﬁrst discussions as well that in practical matters you can
give an approximate account.21
Later, at 121. 15–16,he quotes the list of virtues in book2, 1108A26–
9, saying:
πρ+τερον µν γρ *ν τ52 διαγραφ52 κοιν+τερον αupsilonlenisτν φιλαν ε%πε.
Earlier, in the diagram, he has called it ‘friendship’ using the term in a
general way.
Book 1 is indicated as the beginning of the entire ethical work, and
book 2 as something that precedes book 4.
Later, in the commentary on books 7–8, both book 1 and book 2
are indicated with phrases such as ‘at the beginning’, and book 6
is mentioned as something which comes ‘earlier’. In fact, the com-
mentary on book 7 refers to book 2 as ‘in the ﬁrst discussions’ and
to book 6 as ‘before’ or ‘in the previous discussion’. Let us examine
the passages.
Citation of book 2
. . . Mν *ν τος κατ) ρχς λ+γοις νασθητον λεγε. (132. 2–3, referring to
1104A2, νασθητ+ς τις)
. . . whom in the ﬁrst discussions he called ‘insentient’.
Citations of book 6
8σπερ κα πρ+τερον λεγεν, Nθικ ρετ τθεται *νοτε µν  φυσικ, στι δ
?τε  *κ τοupsilontilde θους (136. 31–2 referring to 1144B2+1144A6–7)
But, as he said also before, sometimes it is natural virtue that is posited as
ethical virtue, but also sometimes the virtue derived from habituation.
δ$δεικται γρ *ν τος µπροσθεν λ+γοις (140. 23, referring to 1145A1–2)
It has been demonstrated in the previous discussions.
But in his commentary on book 7, as Kenny noticed, Aspasius
quotes book 2 with the expression ‘elsewhere’:
21 See NE 1126A31–2: M δ κα *ν τος πρ+τερον ε4ρηται κτλ., the reference being
to 1094B24.
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Bδως δ νupsilontildeν τν χαupsilontildeνον ε%πεν *οικ$ναι τ<' *λευθερ<ω, *ν /λλοις εBπOν τν /σωτον
αupsilonlenisτ<' ?µοιον ε%ναι κατ τν φαντασαν. (138. 22–3, referring to 2, 1108B22)
In a peculiar sense he says now that the vain resemble the liberal, elsewhere
he says that it is the spendthrift that resembles them in appearance.
According to Kenny, Aspasius here cites book 2 as if it were part
of a di·erent work. Kenny also says that the passage of the com-
mentary on (NE) book 8, 178. 19–22, where Aspasius refers to the
(common) book 5 with the expression ‘elsewhere’, indicates the
same relationship between the two sets of books:
λ$γει δ *ν /λλοις 4σον τ κατ) ριθµ+ν.
Elsewhere he calls ‘equal’ that which is equal according to number—
the reference being to 5, 1134A28. In Kenny’s view the commen-
taries on the Nicomachean Ethics books and those on the common
books each refer to books of the other group as belonging to a dif-
ferent work. But his conclusion is not necessary. It is true that in
Aristotle the expression ‘elsewhere’ (*ν /λλοις) usually means ‘in
another work’,22 but this does not apply to Aspasius, who uses the
expression in a freer way. For instance, in the commentary on book
1 he uses it to refer to another part of that same book:
*ν /λλοις δ τ .ς πεφυκος πεθεσθαι /λογον καλε δι τ µ χειν 4διον λ+γον.
(18. 6–9, referring to 1, 1102B25–34)
Elsewhere he calls that which can be persuaded (by reason) ‘irrational’
because it does not possess its own reasoning capacity.
I turn now to the commentary on book 8. Aspasius there cites
book 1 by means of the expression ‘at the beginning’:
. . . 8σπερ κα *ν τος κατ) ρχς λ+γοις λεγε. (162. 2–3, referring to 1096A6)23
. . . as he said in the discussions at the beginning.
At 158. 9–14 he refers back to NE 2. 7, 1108A26–30, and 4. 12,
1126B10–20, without any explicit indication. But the commentary
on book 8 refers most to book 5, because of their similarity of
content and the connection between the concepts of ‘friendship’
and ‘justice’: cf. 175. 3–4, where the phrase ‘equality according to
22 Cf. M. Burnyeat, A Map of Metaphysics Z (Pittsburgh, 2001), 29. But there
are exceptions in Aristotle as well:Metaph. 1017B9, 1046A6, 1055B7, 1056B35.
23 The passage is quoted verbatim immediately after.
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proportion’ ( κατ ναλογαν Bσ+της, cf. NE 5, 1134A5–6) is cited.
It is true that at 160. 11 Aspasius refers to NE 5, 1134B9–19, with
the words ‘in the (discussions) on justice’:
πολλ γρ ε4δη τοupsilontilde δικαου, καθ=περ *λ$χθη *ν τος περ δικαιοσupsilonacuteνης.
For there are many kinds of just thing, as was said in the (discussions)
on justice—
the reference being toNE 5, 1134B9–19. But the expression ‘in the
(discussions) on justice’ does not necessarily indicate that Aspasius
is referring to book 5 as another work. It is simply a di·erent way
of referring to a preceding book, used for variatio. Further, in his
commentary on NE 2. 7, when Aspasius encounters a phrase by
which Aristotle refers to the common books 5 and 6 as later parts
of the same work,24 he is not surprised and paraphrases it without
any problem:
περ δ δικαιοσupsilonacuteνης upsilonasperacuteστερον *ρεν *παγγ$λλεται κα περ τ'ν λογικ'ν ρετ'ν.
(55. 27–8)
About justice he promises to speak later, and about the rational virtues.
In modern times many have doubted the authenticity of this pas-
sage, but Aspasius has no problems with it and, when commenting
on book 2, he quotes books 5 and 6 as belonging to the same work.
He ﬁnds it natural that the discussions about justice and rational
virtue in books 5 and 6 should follow the discussion of particular
virtues in book 4.
In sum, in his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics we have a
series of references which indicate that Aspasius considers all the
di·erent books to be on the same level and to belong to the same
work.25 In his comments on the ﬁrst books he often cites the last
books as something that will come later, and in the comments on the
last books he cites the ﬁrst and second as something already read,
or read at the beginning. To be sure, the network of quotations is
24 ‘With regard to justice, since it has more than one meaning, we shall distinguish
those meanings and say how each one is a mean, after describing the other states;
and we shall do the same also with regard to the rational virtues’ (περ δ δικαιοσupsilonacuteνης,
*πε οupsilonlenisχ Pπλ'ς λ$γεται, µετ ταupsilontildeτα διελ+µενοι περ Qκατ$ρας *ροupsilontildeµεν π'ς µεσ+τητες
εBσν· Cµοως δ κα περ τ'ν λογικ'ν ρετ'ν, 1108B8–10). Grant, Ramsauer, Stewart,
Burnet, andGauthier consider theNicomachean Ethics passage interpolated, because
for Aristotle the rational virtues are not µεσ+τητες. Dirlmeier, Tricot, Rackham,
Irwin, and Broadie and Rowe accept the received text.
25 Cf. Becchi, ‘Aspasio’, 5368.
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not complete. There are books never cited in the commentary on
some other book (for instance, that on book 1 never refers to book 2)
or never cited at all (9). There are books with plenty of citations
(7, 8) and books whose commentaries scarcely cite others at all (2).
There are booksmuch cited (6) and books scarcely referred to. The
commentary on book 3 never cites other books and book 3 itself is
cited only in the commentary on book 7. This evidently depends
partly on the content, and partly on the necessity Aspasius felt to
refer to some parts of the Nicomachean Ethicsmore than to others.
It is not an indication of the situation of the text in his time.
It is extremely unlikely that Aspasius wanted to attribute to Eu-
demus either book 7 or the entire group of books 5–7. But what
did he want to say in the passage I quoted at the beginning? An
analysis of the context may provide an answer.
4. Aspasius’ comments onNE 1153B1–12
To understand Aspasius’ commentary on 1153B1–12, where the
section quoted at the beginning of this article is to be found, we
must bear in mind that his general interpretation is di·erent from
ours, and that he takes many unsound positions in his commentary
on the last part of NE 7. According to Aspasius, the defender of
the thesis that pleasure is not a good is Antisthenes (142. 9) and
not Speusippus. He thinks that Speusippus is a hedonist, and that
Aristotle agrees with him but wants to replace one of his arguments
with a better one in the ﬁrst lines of NE 7. 14.
On Aspasius’ interpretation, the argument of NE 1153B1–7 is to
be reconstructed as follows:
(1) People say that Speusippus maintained that the opposite of
evil is good; but pain is an evil; so its opposite, pleasure, is
a good (150. 3–4).
(2) Aristotle corrects Speusippus’ argument and says: the oppo-
site of what is to be avoided is good; pain is to be avoided;
pleasure is not an evil and it is the opposite of pain; therefore
pleasure is good (150. 4–8).
(3) The preceding argument is against those who maintain that
pleasure is neither a good nor an evil (150. 8–9).
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By contrast, at the beginning of NE 7. 14, according to modern
interpretations,
(1{) Aristotle accepts the common opinion that pain is an evil,
absolutely or because it is an obstacle (1153B1–3).
(2{) Aristotle, following an argument by Eudoxus,26 a¶rms that
the opposite of what is evil is good; necessarily, then, plea-
sure is a good (b3–4).
(3{) Aristotle quotes Speusippus as being opposed to point (2{),
saying that one excess is opposed to the other excess and to
the right intermediate (Speusippus’ point seems to be that
there is more than one opposite: pleasure and pain are two
excesses, to which the right intermediate, absence of both
pleasure and pain, is equally opposed, b4–6). This solution,
adds Aristotle, does not work: in fact not even Speusippus
could admit that pleasure is an evil (b6–7).27
Aspasius attributes to Aristotle a version of Speusippus’ double
opposition theory, whereby to an evil both another evil and a good
are opposite. To conﬁrm this, he quotes the example of an ethical
virtue, where two bad states are opposed to the right intermediate:
‘For example, not only is courage, which is a good thing, the oppo-
site of rashness, but so too is a bad thing, cowardice’ (150. 23–4). To
arrive at his conclusion Aristotle must assume both that pleasure is
opposed to pain and that pleasure is not an evil (150. 25–30).
Aspasius attributes to common opinion what Aristotle attributes
to Speusippus, and takes as subject of the phrase ‘for [he] would not
have said that pleasure is something <essentially evil>‘ (NE 1153B6–
7) not Speusippus, but ‘anybody’ (οupsilonlenisδες, 150. 7). The premiss,
which appears to be ad hominem against Speusippus, becomes an
endoxic premiss which applies universally. Therefore, if the con-
trary of pain, which is an evil, is either an evil or a good and if
pleasure is the contrary of pain and is not an evil, necessarily plea-
sure is a good.
The controversy between Speusippus and Aristotle does not de-
pend on an opposition between theories (pleasure is good/pleasure
26 Cf. NE 10, 1172B18–20: ‘He [Eudoxus] believed that the same conclusion fol-
lowed with the same clarity from the contraries: because pain per se is a thing to
be avoided for everybody, in the same way its contrary [pleasure] is choiceworthy
for all.’
27 I follow the interpretation given by J. Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle (London,
1900), 336, and others.
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is bad), but becomes merely a di·erence in their ways of arguing,
Aristotle’s argument being judged by Aspasius more e·ective than
Speusippus’. This is Aspasius’ strange interpretation of the ﬁrst ar-
gument. It is paradoxical that Aspasius, who knowsNE 10. 1–5 and
quotes it verbatim a few pages later, did not realize that argument
(2{) is not by Speusippus but by Eudoxus. Evidently he took the
reference to Speusippus at 1153B5 to refer to the preceding lines.
In his analysis of Aristotle’s second argument Aspasius fares no
better. The text of his commentary here is full of lacunae and dif-
ﬁcult to understand. Editors have tried to amend it by conjecture,
but the results are uncertain.
Aspasius ﬁnds a di¶culty in the argument of lines 1153B7–12:
he thinks that the argument proves too much, namely, not only
that pleasure is a good, but also that some pleasure is the supreme
good, i.e. happiness. He is not alone in thinking this. It is possible
to interpret the argument, taken literally, in this way. However,
since such an interpretation is fully hedonistic and conﬂicts with
the theory of NE 10. 1–5, nearly all interpreters reject it.28 They
take the passage to mean simply that the supreme good is pleasant,
and not that some pleasure is the supreme good.29 But let us return
to Aspasius.
The opposing parties in this dispute are not, according to As-
pasius, Aristotle and those who maintain that pleasure is an evil
(as in chapter 13),30 nor two groups of philosophers who think that
pleasure is a good but defend this position with di·erent arguments
(as at 1153B1–7). They are, on the one side, those who deny that
pleasure is the supreme good, and on the other those hedonists, not
to be identiﬁed with Aristotle, who allow that it is.
The hedonist’s argument is against a view which is not in the list
of anti-hedonist positions catalogued at 142. 29–33:
λλ) οupsilonlenistildeν τος µν δοκε µηδεµα δον ε%ναι γαθ+ν, τος δ µα µν γαθ,
αR δ πολλα φαupsilontildeλαι, τος δ εB κα πSσαι γαθν ?µως µ ε%ναι τν δονν
τ /ριστον, τουτ$στιν µ ε%ναι εupsilonlenisδαιµοναν, ο(ς *ναντιοupsilontildeνται οR λ$γοντες τν
εupsilonlenisδαιµοναν δονν ε%ναι.
28 See e.g. the discussion byF.Dirlmeier,Aristoteles: Nikomachische Ethik (Berlin,
1956), 503.
29 This is the opinion of Stewart, Gauthier, Irwin, and Broadie. Burnet thinks
that it is only an ad hominem argument against the anti-hedonists.
30 Aspasius takes Aristotle to be the opponent of the anti-hedonists at 148. 2, 15,
23, 30; 149. 8, 20, 28.
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Now then, some believe (a) that no pleasure is a good, others (b) that one is
good but many are base, and still others that (c) though all pleasures are a
good, nevertheless pleasure is not the best, that is, it is not well-being, while
(d) those who say that well-being is pleasure are opposed to these last.31
The anti-hedonist in question says (e) that pleasure is not the best
thing and the supreme good because some pleasures are base—a
very weak position, it seems to me. After setting out their position
Aspasius seems to refer to an argument in favour of (e), but in
the text there is at least one lacuna, and the argument itself is
unintelligible.32
That the argument in these lines is one in favour of those who
support (e) and not against them is demonstrated by the fact that
some unknownhedonists object to this very argument by introduc-
ing another. They say (*νστανται, 151. 1–2), ( f ):
τ γρ κωλupsilonacuteει φαupsilonacuteλων δον'ν οupsilonlenisσ'ν ε%να τινα δονν τ /ριστον τ'ν νθρωπ-
νων γαθ'ν, 8σπερ κα *πιστµη τς *στιν  ρστη τ'ν Tντων, ο(ον  σοφα,
κατοι πολλ'ν τεχν'ν φαupsilonacuteλων οupsilonlenisσ'ν, ο(ον τ'ν βαναupsilonacuteσων; (151. 2–4)
For even though there are base pleasures,what prevents some pleasure from
being the best among human goods?—just as a certain kind of knowledge
is best of those that exist, for example wisdom, even though there are many
base arts, such as the artisanal ones.33
Here Aspasius paraphrases NE 1153B7–9 without attributing it to
Aristotle.
Instead, Aspasius attributes to Aristotle the position expressed
in the following lines, 1153B9–12, but seems to have doubts as to
whether Aristotle is right:
> δ) Qξ2ς *πιφ$ρει, τ=χα /ν τ<ω δ+ξειεν ληθ2 ποφαιν+µενα τ µ$γιστον κα
/ριστον τν δονν. λ$γει γρ 4σως δ κα ναγκαον αRρετ@τατον ε%ναι, δηλον+τι
τν δονν, τ δ αRρετ@τατ+ν τι ε%ναι *π τ$λει *στ τοupsilontilde λ+γου κα συνηγορεται
τ<' λ+γ<ω π=ντων αRρετ@τατον ε%ναι τν δονν λ$γοντι. (151. 6–10)
What he [Aristotle] adduces next may perhaps seem to someone to be true,
31 This repeats what Aristotle says atNE 1152B8–12, with the addition of the last
position (*ναντιοupsilontildeνται, 32).
32 ?σον γρ *π τοupsilonacuteτ<ω τ<' λ+γ<ω στι τιν δονν * γεται τ /ριστον [τ /ριστον N;
/ριστον Parisinus gr. 1902, fo. 116r] κα ταupsilonlenisτν τ52 εupsilonlenisδαιµον6α (150. 33–151. 1).
33 The example of the bad type of science, the arts of manual workers, although
not found in the Nicomachean Ethics, is present in MM 1205A32. However, direct
inﬂuence ofMagna moralia on Aspasius seems not to be possible, because inMagna
moralia the argument tends to show only that pleasure is a good thing, whereas in
the Nicomachean Ethics the thesis is that pleasure is the supreme good.
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a¶rming that pleasure is the greatest and the best thing. For he says that
‘perhaps it is also necessary’ [1153B9] that it—pleasure, obviously—be the
most choiceworthy thing.
The argument for this is given in lines 10–15, according to Aspa-
sius (g):
å if ‘unimpeded activities’ of the best states occur when there is
nothing impeding them,
å if happiness is the unimpeded activity of all the habitual states
or of one of them,
å and if pleasure is the unimpeded activity of somehabitual state,
å then it is clear that some pleasure would be the supreme good,
i.e. happiness.
Next, at 151. 16–18 Aspasius concludes:
στι δ$, 8ς φησι, τ Qξ2ς τ2ς φρ=σεως· 4σως δ ναγκαον αRρετωτ=την ε%ναι
τν δονν, ε4περ Qκ=στης Hξεως κα τ Qξ2ς· δι µν οupsilonlenistildeν τοupsilonacuteτων δοκε ταupsilonlenisτν
ποφανεσθαι τγαθ+ν. (151. 16–18)
This is the rest of the sentence, as he says: ‘perhaps it is necessary’ that
pleasure be most choiceworthy, ‘if in fact for each habitual state’ etc. With
these words, then, he seems to say that the good and pleasure are one and
the same.
We have, in e·ect, three positions, the anti-hedonists’ (e), the he-
donists’ (f ), and Aristotle’s argument (g), which seems to support
( f ). But Aspasius sees a danger in attributing to Aristotle the the-
ory that ‘it is evident that some pleasure would be the best and the
most ﬁnal good, even if it happens that there are bad pleasures’.34
And it is at this point that he makes the comments quoted at the
beginning of the paper. Having attributed 1153B7–9 to an unknown
hedonist, Aspasius here goes on to inform us that Aristotle’s ar-
gument is only one from reputed opinion (endoxa), and is perhaps
not endorsed by Aristotle himself. In saying (151. 26) that ‘whether
those words [ταupsilontildeτα] express Eudemus’ or Aristotle’s view, this is an
argument drawn from reputed opinion’, it is clear that he can only
be referring to argument (f ), and not to the whole passage or to the
whole of book 7.35 There is no hypothesis here about the author-
ship of book 7, still less of the three common books. Aspasius says:
34 151. 15: φανερν .ς Vν ε4η τις δον τ /ριστον κα τελει+τατον τ'ν γαθ'ν, εB
οupsilonasperacuteτως τυχε φαupsilonacuteλων οupsilonlenisσ'ν δον'ν.
35 Kenny, Ethics, 30–1 and n. 2; Gottschalk, ‘Aristotelian Philosophy’, 1158.
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in NE 10, where his true doctrine of pleasure is set out, Aristotle
discusses pleasure as if he had never before discussed it. If so, all
the discussion of pleasure in 7. 12–15 might in fact have been seen
as purely endoxical, but there is no sign in the preceding part of his
commentary of any such interpretation. His interpretation seems
to be conﬁned to the argument at NE 1153B9–12 (referred to by
τοupsilontildeτο, 151. 24, and ταupsilontildeτα, 151. 26).
Let us take stock. In this section of the commentary Aspasius has
discussed ﬁrst (150. 3–30)what he takes to be two arguments against
the anti-hedonists, one by Speusippus and one by Aristotle, and has
observed that the second is the better. Next (150. 31–151. 18) he
has discussed argument ( f ), which seems to identify pleasure with
the supreme good and happiness. He ﬁnds that Aristotle appears to
agree with ( f ), to back it with (g), and to consider its conclusions
‘necessary’. At this point, however, he refuses to accept Aristotle’s
words at face value, and looks for a way out of the problem. His
solution consists in saying that
(1) the argument (g) which supports ( f ) is based on popular
opinion;
(2) inNE 10Aristotle says the opposite, and there is no reference
in that book to this argument, or in general to the book 7
discussion;
(3) perhaps (g) is byEudemus, notAristotle, and is anyway based
only on ‘popular opinion’;
(4) ‘Some pleasure is the supreme good’ in reality means ‘Plea-
sure accompanies the supreme good and cannot be separated
from it.’
Why refer (g) to Eudemus, and not to Eudoxus? This remains un-
clear, but the precedingmistake about Speusippus’ position at lines
150. 3–4 implies that Aspasius’ information about the position of
Aristotle’s associates and the Academics is thoroughly confused.
The source of his information is unknown (cf. ‘they say’, 150. 3),
as is the reason why at some point he attributes (g), with some
hesitation, to Eudemus. But at all events, his choice is to all appear-
ances unrelated to the fact that in our manuscripts book 7 of the
Nicomachean Ethics is identical to book 6 of the ‘Eudemian’ Ethics.
There are other puzzling attributions in this section of Aspasius’
commentary. Later, when commenting on chapter 15, he quotes a
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passage fromNE 7, 1154B13–14, as if it were part of Theophrastus’
Ethics:
κα τν 3ναξαγ+ραν αBτιSται Θε+φραστος *ν )Ηθικος λ$γων ?τι *ξελαupsilonacuteνει δον
λupsilonacuteπην Y γε *ναντα. (156. 16–17)
Theophrastus too, in hisEthics, criticizes Anaxagoras, saying that ‘pleasure,
or at least the opposite pleasure, drives out pain’.36
Aspasius’ ways of citing other philosophers deserve to be studied
more carefully. He often quotes Plato, and does so with great pre-
cision, but when he refers to other philosophers—Pythagoreans,
Anaxagoras, the Socratics, Xenophon, Theophrastus, Eudemus,
Andronicus, Boethus, the early Peripatetics, the Stoics—he fails
to maintain the same level of precision in every citation.37His com-
mentary on the last part of book 7 seems somewhat negligent.
Perhaps Konstan is right to say that at the end of his work Aspasius
appears to have been a little tired.38
The only puzzling point that remains to be explained in 151. 18–
26 is the references there to book 10. In the commentary on book 1,
book 10 is referred to simplywith a ‘later’ (upsilonasperacuteστερον, 19. 2 and 23. 28–
9). In the commentary on book 7 there is another implicit reference
to book 10, when Aspasius says that ‘the politician is the guide
as to how happiness could come into being’;39 this refers to NE
1177B12–14:
στι δ κα  τοupsilontilde πολιτικοupsilontilde /σχολος, κα παρ) αupsilonlenisτ τ πολιτεupsilonacuteεσθαι περιποιου-
µ$νη δυναστεας κα τιµς & τν γε εupsilonlenisδαιµοναν αupsilonasperτ<' κα τος πολταις.
The life of the politician is also unleisurely, and, apart from the governing
itself, procures power, honour and at least happiness for himself and the
other citizens.
There is no indication here that the thesis is being derived from
36 The italicized clause is identical to NE 1154B13–14. Diels in app. corrects to
.ς Θε+φραστος. W. W. Fortenbaugh, Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts (Amsterdam,
1984), 79 and 309, and in his edition of Theophrastus’ fragments, places a lacuna
after λ$γων ?τι (see W. W. Fortenbaugh et al., Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his
Life, Writings, Thought and Inﬂuence (Leiden, 1992), 555), which would mean that
the verbatim quotation from Theophrastus’ Ethics has been lost. Likewise Moraux,
Aristotelismus, 266; Gauthier, ‘Introduction’, in R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif (trans.
and comm.), Aristote: ‹Ethique ›a Nicomaque, 2nd edn. (Louvain and Paris, 1970),
92, thinks that Theophrastus repeated Aristotle’s expression word for word. But
those are ad hoc solutions.
37 See Heylbut’s Index nominum, 242–5. 38 Konstan, Commentators, 9.
39 141. 25–6: C δ πολιτικος upsilonasperφηγεται ?πως Vν γ$νοιτο εupsilonlenisδαιµονα.
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a work other than the Nicomachean Ethics, especially as another
internal citation, this time of book 6, immediately follows:
τι φρ+νησις ρχιτεκτονικ λ$γεται, δι+τι τν λ+γον παρ$χει τας Nθικας ρετας.
(141. 26–7)
Furthermore, prudence is called architectonic because it endows the ethical
virtues with reason.40
The commentary on book 7 seems here to be referring to NE 10
and to another common book, 6, in just the same way, as if they
were parts of the same work.
How, then, are we to interpret the expression ‘in theNicomachean
Ethics’ (151. 21–2)? It may simply be an example of stylistic varia-
tio, like ‘in the discussions concerning justice’ (*ν τος περ δικαιοσupsilonacute-
νης, 160. 11), which we met earlier. It does not necessarily indicate
that Aspasius is referring to theNicomacheanEthics as a workwhich
is di·erent from the one on which he is here commenting. This is
conﬁrmed by the fact that in the commentary on book 8, which
is an undisputed part of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aspasius refers
to some lost part of the same Nicomachean Ethics with the expres-
sion ‘in the parts of the Nicomachean Ethics that have fallen out’
(*ν τος *κπεπτωκ+σι τ'ν Νικοµαχεων, 161. 9–10). If so, Moraux’s
claim, that when commenting on theNicomachean Ethics Aspasius
could not refer to another part of the same work with the words
‘in the Nicomacheans’, loses its apparent basis. For if Aspasius at
161. 9–10 refers to other parts of the Nicomachean Ethics with this
very expression, ‘in the parts of the Nicomachean Ethics that have
fallen out’, he can very well use the expression ‘in theNicomachean
Ethics’ at 151. 21–2 to refer to another passage of that work. It is
strange that this passage has been used to support an argument to
the contrary.
Universit›a di Venezia ‘Ca’ Foscari’
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